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## Analysis of Australian Media

Rodney Tiffen  
University of Sydney  
[rod.tiffen@sydney.edu.au](mailto:rod.tiffen@sydney.edu.au)

Hallin and Mancini's landmark work<sup>1</sup> has transformed the comparative study of the politics of the media in developed democracies. Unfortunately, because they base their choice of countries on geography rather than the longevity and quality of democratic institutions, they do not include Australia (or New Zealand or Japan), and have selected countries only from Western Europe and North America.

This paper has three parts. In the first the three most important and influential typologies of democracies, each with a distinctive concern, are outlined and compared. In the second, data comparing Australian media with 17 other democracies are presented. Each is examined also to see how they correspond with Hallin and Mancini's categories. Thirdly and most tentatively there is some conjecture about the interaction of political structures and media structures in terms of news content.

### Three Typologies of Democratic Politics

In comparative social science, two styles of scholarship are sometimes distinguished as lumpers and splitters. As the names imply, lumpers see the similarities between seemingly diverse phenomena, while splitters are intent on uncovering the important distinctions which need to be made when categories are too gross.

Often it is the lumpers who advance bold new theories that become the focus of future scholarly inquiry, or who first make the connections that provide new insights that did not previously exist. So in the nineteenth century, Thorstein Veblen, analysed the behaviour of what he called the leisure class, the emerging *nouveau riche*, whose consumption was guided less by utility than by display behaviour intended to demonstrate their status, their ability to afford their purchases. He coined the term conspicuous consumption, and drew parallels between the then contemporary upper middle class with the behaviour of tribal chiefs and various other remote historical figures, whose consumption was guided by similar display motives. He thus revealed the consistent status dimension of what on the surface were very different types of material behaviour.<sup>2</sup>

Three landmark works by Arend Lijphart, Gosta Esping-Andersen and Dan Hallin and Paolo Mancini have shaped the study of comparative democracies, and we will examine them in turn, seeking first to appreciate what unique insights each gives, then how they relate to each other.

Lijphart's work has had the most profound impact in the study of comparative democratic politics. Lijphart contrasted what he called majoritarian and consensual democracies. His work had its roots in analysing the distinctive politics of his native Netherlands,<sup>3</sup> what he first called consociational democracy. Lijphart overturned what had earlier been an Anglo-Saxon-centric view of democracies, which effectively

party systems, with single member electorates, in terms of values.

There were several problems with this earlier work. The evidence of instability in multi-party systems rested on a few dramatic cases (Weimar Germany, Fourth Republic France, and Italy) while ignoring a larger range of cases ó in the Nordic countries, the low countries, Switzerland ó which had multi-party systems combined with stability and good governance. It had also been impervious to the problems of majoritarian democracies, which gave the winners no incentive to cooperate with the losers, or vice versa, and so sharpened rather than reduced political conflicts. Most particularly, it ignored the problems of a permanent minority. If voting was based upon religious, ethnic or linguistic loyalties, then one group can be permanently frozen out, excluded by the numbers. Perhaps the starkest example was Northern Ireland.

Lijphart's distinction between majoritarian and consensual democracies is in principle a different answer to one of the key dilemmas of democracy ó the relationship between majority rule and minority rights. How are the views of majorities to be implemented, and the rights of minorities to be protected? What aspects of minority sub-cultures should be protected from majority prejudices?

As important as the normative dimension is the analytical one of the different dynamics of the two types of democracy. Lijphart's distinction is between governments which, once elected, and while enjoying a legislative majority, have few obstacles to them exercising executive power. His classic case is Britain, where normally the government consists of a single party, where there is no upper house with veto power, where there were no provincial governments or strong written constitution to constrain government action.

In contrast in consensual systems governments need to keep negotiating, because frequently in a proportional representation electoral system no single party has a clear majority, or because there are more institutional checks and balances that the governing coalition does not control. At first Lijphart emphasised that this was often a better solution in plural societies. By the late 1990s, he was arguing that consensual democracies were better by many measures, with more social welfare and less social conflict ó kinder, gentler democracies. (The term consensual is somewhat loaded. It would be hard to think of an established democracy with less consensus than Belgium, and perhaps coalitional would be a more neutral term.)

His late 1990s work is also more statistical, and Lijphart discovered there were two distinct axes. He labelled the first the parties-executive axis, and this is the heart of the distinction. But the other one, the federal-unitary dimension, shows little correlation with it. Some majoritarian systems ó Australia, the United States and Canada among them ó are federal. This lack of correlation between different types of majority restraining institutions may have implications for his theory but he does not pursue them. For his theorising it is what he calls the executive-parties dimension which is important, and which is focused on here.

Gosta Esping-Andersen's work has had a comparable seismic impact. His book, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, forcefully reshaped analyses of the welfare state.

which together form his three worlds. The first is a right to a livelihood when a service is rendered as a matter of right, without reliance on the market.<sup>4</sup> The second is the degree to which social welfare is based upon a social insurance model.

Together these produce three types of welfare regime. In the liberal welfare state, characteristic of the English-speaking capitalist democracies, there are universal but means-tested and modest transfers, where welfare often plays a residual role, attuned to ameliorating the worst suffering and poverty, restricted to those unable to obtain a decent living through the market. The second type of welfare regime, characteristic especially of the Nordic countries, is quite different. In these social democratic welfare regimes, the principles of de-commodification are universal, and there is much more emphasis on equality, with governments committed to full employment and to all citizens having a right to a high standard of living, thus resulting in much larger social expenditure. Esping-Andersen identifies a distinctive third group, which he labels conservative corporatist. This includes such European countries as Germany, Austria, France and Italy. Here what predominated was the preservation of status differentials; rights, therefore, were attached to class and status.<sup>5</sup> Here the aim is not redistributive. Its basis is in a strong sense of familyhood, especially in Catholic countries, and often with particular benefits going to those in the public service, following a Bismarkian encouragement of a strong, loyal and competent state bureaucracy.

Esping-Andersen's typology shows the different dynamics of each of the three systems. It goes beyond just looking at the size of social expenditure and into its distribution and principles. Interestingly, the social democratic countries, while having comparatively large public sectors, also have low levels of public debt.<sup>6</sup> Several of the conservative corporatist countries combine high levels of public debt, with for example relatively high levels of unemployment (including higher levels of long-term unemployment) and rapidly aging societies.

Now a third typology - one centered explicitly on media and politics - has become a focal point for scholars. Hallin and Mancini have authored a book as impressive and paradigm-forming as the previous two. The basis for their choice of 18 countries is geographical, including only countries from Europe and North America. So they exclude Australia, New Zealand and Japan, all stable democracies.<sup>7</sup> Their justification is that the flow of influence is often associated with geography, what Castles terms 'family resemblances'.<sup>8</sup> There is some truth in this, but clearly being a British colony prior to a democratic independence is an even stronger flow of influence.

They outline four major dimensions.<sup>9</sup> The first is the development of media markets, especially the strong or weak development of a mass circulation press. The second is political parallelism, the degree and nature of the links between the media and political parties, or more broadly the extent to which the media system reflects the major political divisions in society. The third is the development of journalistic professionalism, and the fourth is the degree and nature of state intervention in the media system.

...the developed democracies into three groups, that different. They note that one model, what they American, or Liberal model has been dominant in thinking about what the news media ought to be: "The Liberal Model enshrined in normative theory, based primarily on the American (system) has become so widely diffused around the world that other conceptions of journalism often are not conceptualised clearly even by their own practitioners." And hence there is a tendency to judge "world press systems in terms of their liberal ideal of a neutral watchdog press free from state interference."<sup>10</sup>

In the liberal model, the state is seen as the major threat to freedom. In the English-speaking countries, liberal ideologies accompanied the rise of democracy, and there was the early development of a commercial, mass circulation press, catering to these countries' literate populations. So from early on, there were few formal links between political parties and the news media. To varying degrees these countries also developed relatively strong traditions of journalistic professionalism. The state played varying roles in the development of broadcasting, but most commonly these countries had either a mixed model of public and private channels.

Although not included in their analysis, it is clear that Australia would fall within this Liberal (less happily, North Atlantic) Model.<sup>11</sup>

A second group is what they called the Mediterranean or polarised pluralist model. In the five countries they include here a mass circulation press did not develop as it did in the other two types, and the journalism was of a more opinionated kind, less oriented to reporting. Moreover while the press had partisan traditions, the state played a central role in the development of broadcasting, but with less political autonomy apparent. Finally in these countries, journalism did not develop such strong traditions of professionalism as in the other two models.

The third group is what they call democratic corporatist, and these are the countries from north-western Europe. These countries all had from relatively early times high literacy rates, and also a strong press, independent of government. However in these countries the development of the press was tied more closely to political parties and social groups. Nevertheless at the same time, strong traditions of journalistic professionalism developed, and there was more formal recognition of journalistic autonomy than in the commercial liberal countries. Apart from the higher levels of press-party parallelism, these countries were also characterised by strong traditions of state involvement, although most of the time, and especially since World War II, the state is here not seen as an authoritarian threat, but as an enhancer of social life, including of democracy. So, all these countries developed strong state broadcasters, but usually with strong traditions of autonomy.

Table One presents all three authors' ideal types and their categorisation of countries, and it shows some broad correspondences. All of the countries that Esping-Andersen and Hallin and Mancini label as Liberal fall into Lijphart's category of majoritarian. It has always struck me as ironic in terms of Lijphart's theory that his strongest majoritarian governments, those with fewest restraints upon their action, are by and large the smallest governments, measured in terms of public expenditure as a proportion of GDP. They take less responsibility for the functioning of society,



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ure is the indicator. They thus use their  
ments to do less than the constrained, consensual

Equally, all Esping-Andersen's social democratic welfare regimes involve consensual democracies and democratic corporatist media regimes. All Hallin and Mancini's democratic corporatist media systems occur in consensual democracies. Their polarised pluralist systems show more variation, although none is either a social democratic or liberal welfare regime.

### From Typologies to Variables

All three schema involve ideal types. That is they take what they think are the essential features of a functioning system, although as Hallin and Mancini say, in all existing countries there will be departures from and exceptions to their models. The first and still probably the most impressive use of ideal types in social science was by Max Weber, especially in his work *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* and the subsequent comparative work on major religions and the economic ethics they gave rise to. Here he uncovered the unintended effects of religious teachings and made links between seemingly unconnected social and historical phenomena.

Nevertheless the construction of ideal types led to much arid theorising especially in American sociology in the 1950s and 60s. Possibly the worst example I ever saw was William Kornhauser *The Politics of Mass Society*,<sup>12</sup> where he ploughs on with a four-fold typology, through a whole book, completely untainted by any evidence.

In contrast the three typologies just presented are all excellent examples of how the combination of historical research and model building can yield original and fruitful insights. All three combine sharp analytical insights with a great range of data. It is the lumpers' forceful labelling of groups of countries and the highlighting of the factors which link them together which attracts scholarly attention and shapes new thinking. However it is then often the 'splitters' who examine the groupings critically, by questioning whether those sharing a common label have significant differences, and by drawing out the logic of 'hybrid cases'.

In both Hallin and Mancini's and Esping-Andersen's schemes, it is somewhat misleading to include all these countries simply as liberal. In both, the United States is an outlier. In welfare regimes, Britain, Australia and the other commonwealth countries have long had much more of an established welfare state that respects the rights of recipients more than the United States, although they share many key features. Similarly, the United States is the only advanced democracy which did not begin television with a substantial public broadcaster. On the other hand, the United States has been closer to the polarised pluralist model also in that while the other liberal countries and the corporatist countries it lacked their tradition of public bureaucracies, operating under charter-bounded independence, in a relatively non-partisan way.

A great strength of Hallin and Mancini's work is their exploration of the historical origins and development of news media in each of their three models, and their sense of how these lead to different trajectories. This is particularly true for their excellent

atist countries. It is notable, however, that their use of g-Andersen, draws on the work of Katzenstein (who of democracies, after it had been hijacked to describe only authoritarian regimes, particularly Mussolini's Fascism and Peronism). While Esping-Andersen uses the term to describe politically conservative regimes, and distinguishes them from social democratic ones, Hallin and Mancini merge the two. They tend to then use the term to describe countries where there is more of a sense of an active state and a state-society partnership than in the liberal states, strong civic traditions and a rational-legal bureaucracy in contrast to the polarised pluralist states, and more of a tying of news organisations to political parties and sectional groups than in the market-led liberal states. In exploring the history of these states, they do not distinguish between those countries where the early corporatism gave way to authoritarianism (Germany and Austria) and those where it led to strong democratic traditions (the Scandinavian countries). Nor do they explore when segmented pluralism leads to vibrant democracy and tolerance, as in the Netherlands, and when to simply more sectarianism and intolerance, as in Belgium.

As they are keenly aware, a key issue is when historical trajectories are self-sustaining. In contemporary circumstances, does the original logic still have resonance, does it meet the self-interest of current practitioners, or does it rely more on appeals to tradition and sentiment? Many contemporary trends, most particularly the advent of the multi-channel environment and the rise and rise of the internet, plus continuing globalisation and subsequent pressures on liberalising many aspects of socio-economic life, are leading towards greater homogenisation and commonality.

Hallin and Mancini state that each of their four key variables can be seen as a single, quantitative dimension, although at other times they probe the relationships in a differentiated, qualitative manner. The latter is particularly true with professionalism and journalistic professional creeds, including for example objectivity, although they offer both quantitative and qualitative evidence on the issue. The following section of the paper examines several media variables, almost all involving quantitative measures, comparing Australia with 17 other advanced democracies. In each also we will seek to see how Hallin and Mancini's categories capture the differences.

The tables are adapted from Tiffen and Gittins, and includes the 18 democracies which they have used (ie Australia, New Zealand and Japan are included, and Greece, Spain and Portugal are excluded). These exclusions do have the disadvantage of meaning there are only two of Hallin and Mancini's Polarised Pluralism category, and as they say one of these, France, is a hybrid case. Spain, Portugal and Greece all only made the transition to stable democracies from the 1970s. While four decades is definitely a sufficient period to demonstrate that democratic institutions are now well established in all three, they all have followed a different trajectory, and all were stunted by dictatorship or were late modernisers. In 1974 as they were on the verge of becoming democracies, Greece had 36 per cent of its labour force in agriculture, Portugal 35 per cent and Spain 23 per cent. Australia then had 7 per cent.<sup>13</sup> The three had considerably smaller public sectors, especially in terms of social expenditure, although all three grew very rapidly once they were democratic. Although, all three (especially Spain) have made strides in the intervening years, in all women traditionally suffered more from exclusion from the public sphere than in the other countries included. It is this general gender discrimination that accounts for the low

women in these countries rather than anything about  
les of opinion. More qualitatively, it seems that all  
marked by clientelism than most other democracies.

One measure of this is how they rate on Transparency International's Corruption  
Perceptions Index. It can be seen from Table Two that in this group of 21  
democracies Hallin and Mancini's Polarised Pluralist countries all rank at the bottom.

### **Australian Media Institutions in Comparative Perspective**

The data on newspaper circulation (Table 3) shows Australia in 2007 ranking fourth  
last. The most notable aspect is that in the 27 years covered in the table, Australia's  
newspaper penetration fell more sharply than any of the others, essentially halving  
over the period. Australia's circulation in 1980 was just under the 18 country mean,  
but by 2007 was only just above half the mean. It should be noted that despite the  
pessimism about newspapers, the overall decline in circulation was only modest, with  
four countries actually showing increases in newspaper penetration, and many others  
having only slight declines. The biggest factor explaining Australia's decline was the  
closure of so many titles. In the period all seven of Australia's afternoon newspapers  
closed. However even a majority of the surviving ones declined in circulation.

The rankings broadly correlate with Hallin and Mancini's types, with the polarised  
pluralist countries at the bottom and the democratic corporatist countries at the top.  
Not for the only times in these tables, Belgium behaves more like a polarised pluralist  
country and Britain more like a corporatist one.

Apart from circulation density, there are two other notable ways in which the position  
of the press varies in these countries. Part of this derives from demography, affecting  
not only the total size of the market, but, more importantly in this case, its structure  
(Table 4). There has always been an important difference between those countries  
where the political capital is also the largest city in population, and is additionally the  
centre of business and cultural life in the country. In capital cities such as London,  
Paris and Tokyo, there is centered what is essentially a national press. This is also  
true of many of the smaller European countries which have a single city which is  
clearly the biggest and most important, or where newspapers circulate nationally.  
There is also in nearly all of them a provincial press, but in all these countries there  
are national newspapers which are large organisations, which compete with one  
another, and therefore often mark out distinctive appeals, both journalistic and  
political, from their competitors.

In contrast, in the four New World democracies the largest city is not the capital, and  
there is more decentralised spread of population, with several cities nearer in  
importance to each other. In these countries there has not (until recently) been a  
national press, but more one based on cities and towns. In larger cities there was  
often some competition, but this was typically much more restricted than in those  
countries where a national press operates. Often there was local monopoly.

In such situations, the market logic was to be politically and journalistically centrist.  
They would typically engage in regional boosterism, and moreover there was no  
market incentive to be responsive to minority groups. But in terms of major political  
parties there was no market incentives to be pro-one side or the other. On the other

market latitude, and this could allow local owners  
with little commercial punishment. In the United  
States, ethnic centrism and partisan neutrality was the

importance of news agencies, allowing newspapers to cover the world beyond their  
local area, and so catering to a large range of clients. To some degree this was also  
true of Britain, especially the provincial papers, but less true of Australia with its  
smaller market and more concentrated ownership.

Another quite striking contrast in the press in the different democracies is their  
relative dependence on advertising as a base of support (Table 5). In the liberal,  
English-speaking countries in particular, especially those with a more decentralised  
press structure, reliance on advertising is particularly great, with American  
newspapers earning almost nine in every ten dollars from that source. While Japanese  
newspapers have just over one third of their revenue from advertising, Australian  
newspapers have around two thirds. Interestingly this shows little correlation with the  
density of newspaper circulation.

In terms of the size of the advertising industry as measured by advertising as a  
proportion of GDP (Table 6) - there is some tendency for the liberal countries to have  
the most and the polarised pluralist the least.

The size of the advertising industry in relation to the total economy shows little  
relationship to the distribution of media in which different countries advertising  
expenditure is invested. One confounding factor in reading Table 7 is that the internet  
has become an important advertising outlet in the different democracies at very  
different rates. While one in six advertising dollars are invested in the internet in  
Britain, only about one in every 70 advertising dollars are so invested in Switzerland.  
There are variations in this adoption of the internet in each of Hallin and Mancini's  
three categories. However, especially if these are put to one side, it seems that there  
is some correspondence between the typologies and the relative advertising  
investment in television and newspapers. Television's share is greatest in the  
polarised pluralist countries (especially if Belgium is included in that category). Next  
come the liberal countries and last comes the corporatist ones. To some degree this  
indicates how television was less of a commercial enterprise in many of these  
countries. While there is quite a bit of noise from other columns, and the correlation  
is somewhat less than perfect, to a considerable degree the descending list of the share  
given to TV corresponds to the ascending list of the share given to newspapers.

Originally (ie in the decades after TV became important) there was limited scope for  
advertising on television, especially in many of the democratic corporatist countries,  
as Table 8 shows. It also shows a considerable movement in the last three decades of  
the twentieth century from public monopoly to mixed systems. With some exceptions  
it shows the greater state involvement in the corporatist countries, and the greater  
scope for commercial forces in television in the liberal countries.

Tables 9 and 10 provide more perspective on this, by showing the relative popularity  
and government investment in public broadcasting. With the notable exception of  
Britain in both tables, showing both the investment in and relative popularity of the  
BBC, the liberal countries come towards the bottom of the tables, and, while showing  
quite a range, the corporatist countries are towards the top. Table 10 shows the very



ding of public broadcasters, with again the liberal  
t the bottom of the table. It also shows the variation  
hat are called public broadcasters. New Zealand's  
public broadcasting, for example, now depends far more on advertising than  
government support, with Italy and Ireland following in the same direction. On the  
other hand, in Japan, public revenue forms the whole of NHK's income. From an  
Australian perspective, the most notable aspect is that eight out of 16 countries  
provide double or more the funding on a per capita basis that the ABC receives.

Although the multi-channel broadcasting environment is breaking down many old  
differences, their continuing relevance is indicated to some extent in Table 11. Only  
in some liberal and polarised pluralist countries were a majority of household still  
receiving television by terrestrial transmission early in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In contrast  
the top of the table is mainly occupied by corporatist countries. In particular it is  
cable TV that requires the greatest investment in new infrastructure, and while it cuts  
across categories to some extent, again it is some liberal and polarised pluralist  
countries that have done least in this regard. There are other factors at work ó  
for example the crowding of the spectrum, and that it is easier for smaller, densely  
populated countries to lay out cable ó but the table also suggest the continuing  
importance of media policy orientations.

### **Political Institutions and Party Systems/Publicity Interests and Structures of Disclosure**

News is a parasitic institution.<sup>14</sup> It feeds off the information that other major  
institutions and sources make available. In understanding the role of the news media  
in a particular country then, it is just as important to examine its political structures as  
its media ones. It is these structures that will determine the ways in which  
information becomes routinely available to the media. It is these that will influence  
the types of newsworthy occasions on which the media can easily report. It is these  
that will determine the publicity interests and strategies of major sources, particularly  
political parties.

Here Lijphart's distinction between majoritarian and consensual democracies can give  
some useful insights. As a preliminary it is important to note that we are here  
concerned with publicity interests in news outlets which reach audiences which cut  
across political constituencies. It is not concerned with publicity interests where  
communication channels are determined by segmented pluralism, where political  
sources are communicating principally with their own supporters or constituency.

In the pre-Lijphart thinking about multi-party systems, it was assumed that the key  
interest was for parties to keep their constituencies intact, to keep their core vote,  
which they could only increase slightly. This led to rigidity and intolerance. In  
contrast in a two-sided party contest, the key was to attract a majority, to become a  
catch-all party and therefore responsive to public opinion, and prepared to  
compromise.

Lijphart's perspective transforms this, or at least adds a dimension which gives a very  
different view. In a majoritarian system, the two-sided contest to form government is  
a zero-sum, winner-take-all game decided by public opinion.<sup>15</sup> On the one hand, this

ty, and hence catch-all political parties, and helps to  
is a policy convergence between the major parties.  
a ruthless pursuit of the conflict ó there can be only  
one winner, and that overshadows all aspects of their strategy. Arguably, for  
example, it leads to more emphasis on scandals, and personal attacks, as each side  
thinks that if they can fundamentally discredit the other in the eyes of the electorate,  
then it will make their task easier.

In a multi-party system, based upon a multi-member, proportional representation  
electoral system, on the other hand, most governments will be coalitions and  
sometimes minority governments. In these systems, there will be a continuing, post-  
election need to negotiate and compromise with each other. When it works well, it  
means that despite continuing ideological differences, there is a realism and attention  
to detail in policy debate that is often missing in the two-sided systems.

Of course, politics is not perfect anywhere. And the multi-party systems are just as  
prone to irrational and expedient behaviour as the two-sided party competitions.  
Indeed extremist right-wing populist parties have made more of an impact in these  
systems than in the two-sided ones.

Two-sided party contests are almost unique among political conflicts in that there no  
win-win outcomes are possible, and the two sides almost never have to work together  
to arrive at a joint position. In contrast many other types of political relationship  
involve conflict at some times, and co-operation and common interests at others.  
Relations between different levels of government ó although always overlaid by  
partisan interests ó are often ruled by expedience, but sometimes there is a common  
interest in generating a solution as well. (In Europe, the EU adds a supra-national  
level to this as well.)

While the logic of the party competition is the dominant one, what the news media  
discloses, their tone and to some extent even the way they frame the news is a product  
of the configuration of political institutions and sourcesøpublicity interests. In this  
sense also it should not be assumed that the way the news media report politics in  
Australia is the only or natural way. While a difficult area to research, this is also an  
intriguing area for future comparative research.

ologies

		Esping-Andersen	Hallin/Mancini
United Kingdom	Majoritarian	Liberal	Liberal
New Zealand	Majoritarian	Liberal	(Liberal)
Canada	Majoritarian	Liberal	Liberal
France	Majoritarian	Corporatist	Polarised Pluralist
Australia	Majoritarian	Liberal	(Liberal)
Greece	Majoritarian	..	Polarised Pluralist
Spain	Majoritarian	..	Polarised Pluralist
United States	Majoritarian	Liberal	Liberal
Ireland	Majoritarian	Liberal	Liberal
Germany	Consensual	Corporatist	Democratic Corporatist
Austria	Consensual	Corporatist	Democratic Corporatist
Portugal	Consensual	..	Polarised Pluralist
Japan	Consensual	..	..
Norway	Consensual	Social Democratic	Democratic Corporatist
Sweden	Consensual	Social Democratic	Democratic Corporatist
Italy	Consensual	Corporatist	Polarised Pluralist
Netherlands	Consensual	Corporatist	Democratic Corporatist
Belgium	Consensual	Corporatist	Democratic Corporatist
Denmark	Consensual	Social Democratic	Democratic Corporatist
Finland	Consensual	Social Democratic	Democratic Corporatist
Switzerland	Consensual	Corporatist	Democratic Corporatist

The countries are ranked according to Lijphart's scores on his Executive-Parties Dimension 1971-1996. (Note that for example since the introduction of MMP, New Zealand would have moved down considerably.) The data for Esping-Andersen's countries is incomplete, but I think he ranks all the Southern European ones as Corporatist.

### Corruption 2008

		TI Score	Hallin-Mancini Media Type
1 =	Denmark	9.3	Democratic Corporatist
1 =	New Zealand	9.3	Liberal
1 =	Sweden	9.3	Democratic Corporatist
5 =	Finland	9.0	Democratic Corporatist
5 =	Switzerland	9.0	Democratic Corporatist
7 =	Netherlands	8.9	Democratic Corporatist
9 =	Australia	8.7	Liberal
9 =	Canada	8.7	Liberal
12 =	Austria	8.1	Democratic Corporatist
14 =	Germany	7.9	Democratic Corporatist
14 =	Norway	7.9	Democratic Corporatist
16 =	Ireland	7.7	Liberal
16 =	United Kingdom	7.7	Liberal
18 =	Belgium	7.3	Democratic Corporatist
18 =	Japan	7.3	..
18 =	United States	7.3	Liberal
23	France	6.9	Polarised Pluralist
28	Spain	6.5	Polarised Pluralist
32	Portugal	6.1	Polarised Pluralist
55	Italy	4.8	Polarised Pluralist
57	Greece	4.7	Polarised Pluralist

Each year Transparency International conducts its Corruption Perceptions Index. In 2008 it scored 180 countries. Scores range from 0 most corrupt to 10 not corrupt. The table gives countries' scores and their global rankings for 2008. See <http://www.transparency.org>

lation

ers per 1000 population

Country	1980	2007	Hallin/Mancini
Japan	567	624	..
Norway	463	580	Corporatist
Finland	505	503	Corporatist
Sweden	528	449	Corporatist
Switzerland	393	355	Corporatist
Austria	351	345	Corporatist
United Kingdom	417	308	Liberal
Germany	..	291	Corporatist
Denmark	366	280	Corporatist
Netherlands	326	268	Corporatist
Ireland	229	236	Liberal
New Zealand	334	216	Liberal
United States	270	213	Liberal
Canada	221	173	Liberal
<b>Australia</b>	<b>323</b>	<b>166</b>	Liberal
Belgium	232	161	Corporatist
France	192	154	Polarised Pluralist
Italy	101	112	Polarised Pluralist
Mean	342	302	

### Media Competition

Country	Media System	Capital biggest city?
Japan	..	Yes
Norway	Democratic Corporatist	Yes
Sweden	Democratic Corporatist	Yes
Netherlands	Democratic Corporatist	Yes
Belgium	Democratic Corporatist	Yes
Denmark	Democratic Corporatist	Yes
Finland	Democratic Corporatist	Yes
Germany	Democratic Corporatist	Yes
Austria	Democratic Corporatist	Yes
United Kingdom	Liberal	Yes
Ireland	Liberal	Yes
France	Polarised Pluralist	Yes
Greece	Polarised Pluralist	Yes
Spain	Polarised Pluralist	Yes
Portugal	Polarised Pluralist	Yes
Italy	Polarised Pluralist	Yes
Switzerland	Democratic Corporatist	No
New Zealand	Liberal	No
Canada	Liberal	No
Australia	Liberal	No
United States	Liberal	No

Does the country have a capital city which is the biggest city, political capital, centre of business and cultural life? And so is there a competitive national press with competing titles having distinctive appeals? Or a more decentralised press, with more regional monopolies and oligopolies?

## Revenue and Advertising

from advertising, 2007

Country	%	Hallin/Mancini
United States	86	Liberal
Canada	77	Liberal
Ireland	72	Liberal
<b>Australia</b>	<b>65</b>	Liberal
Belgium	58	Corporatist
Finland	54	Corporatist
Sweden	53	Corporatist
Germany	53	Corporatist
United Kingdom	51	Liberal
Italy	49	Polarised Pluralist
Netherlands	47	Corporatist
Denmark	39	Corporatist
France	38	Polarised Pluralist
Japan	36	..
Mean	55	

No data for New Zealand, Austria, Norway, Switzerland

of GDP

Country	%	Hallin/Mancini
United States	1.35	Liberal
New Zealand	1.31	Liberal
Japan	1.28	..
<b>Australia</b>	<b>1.12</b>	Liberal
Norway	1.05	Corporatist
Netherlands	0.98	Corporatist
Ireland	0.94	Liberal
United Kingdom	0.94	Liberal
Austria	0.87	Corporatist
Belgium	0.85	Corporatist
Switzerland	0.78	Corporatist
Denmark	0.76	Corporatist
Finland	0.74	Corporatist
Germany	0.73	Corporatist
Canada	0.71	Liberal
Sweden	0.69	Corporatist
Italy	0.59	Polarised Pluralist
France	0.56	Polarised Pluralist
Mean	0.91	



### Advertising Shares

Each medium 2007

Country	Television	Radio	Newspapers	Internet	Hallin/Mancini
Italy	53.2	6.7	18.9	3.2	Polarised Pluralist
Japan	44.8	3.7	21.3	10.1	..
Belgium	38.2	12.2	29.3	3.3	Corporatist
France	33.9	7.6	14.8	12.2	Polarised Pluralist
United States	32.8	11.8	27.9	9.0	Liberal
<b>Australia</b>	<b>31.5</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>34.6</b>	<b>13.7</b>	Liberal
New Zealand	29.6	12.7	37.6	4.1	Liberal
Canada	28.4	13.6	35.2	12.5	Liberal
UK	26.6	3.7	31.1	18.8	Liberal
Switzerland	25.2	3.5	36.2	1.3	Corporatist
Germany	24.2	4.1	39.2	4.1	Corporatist
Austria	24.1	6.8	39.7	3.1	Corporatist
Norway	23.5	4.6	42.0	16.9	Corporatist
Netherlands	22.8	7.2	39.5	4.0	Corporatist
Sweden	21.2	3.0	41.5	17.9	Corporatist
Finland	19.5	3.7	53.5	4.4	Corporatist
Ireland	18.7	7.3	60.9	2.6	Liberal
Denmark	17.9	2.2	42.6	17.2	Corporatist
Mean	28.7	6.8	35.9	8.8	

#### Notes:

Between 2003 and 2007 the internet's share of advertising in the 18 countries overall increased from 2.8% to 8.8%. Newspapers declined from 39.3% to 35.9%, and most others showed minor decreases.

Percentages should be read across, but do not sum to 100 because the following columns have been omitted:

Cinema: Mean = 0.7% with limited spread between countries.

Outdoor: Mean = 5.9%. Highest = Japan (11.9); Switzerland (11.0) and France (10.6). Australia = 3.6.

Magazines: Mean = 12.8%. Highest = Germany (22.8); Netherlands (21.8) and Switzerland (21.4). Australia = 7.0

**Institutional Basis**

Commercial Television Broadcasting and number of channels

(public + private) available in largest city

Country	1970 System	Channels	1999 System	Channels	Hallin/Mancini
Austria	Public	2	Public	2	Corporatist
Denmark	Public	3	Public	2	Corporatist
Netherlands	Public	2	Public	3	Corporatist
Switzerland	Public	3	Public	3	Corporatist
Belgium	Public	2	Mixed	2+2	Corporatist
France	Public	4	Mixed	2+3	Polarised Pluralist
Germany	Public	3	Mixed	3+3	Corporatist
Ireland	Public	2	Mixed	3+1	Liberal
Italy	Public	2	Mixed	3+8	Polarised Pluralist
New Zealand	Public	1	Mixed	2+2	Liberal
Norway	Public	2	Mixed	2+1	Corporatist
Sweden	Public	2	Mixed	2+1	Corporatist
Australia	Mixed	1+3	Mixed	2+3	Liberal
Canada	Mixed	2+1	Mixed	2+2	Liberal
Finland	Mixed	2+1	Mixed	3+2	Corporatist
Japan	Mixed	2+5	Mixed	2+5	..
United Kingdom	Mixed	2+1	Mixed	3+2	Liberal
United States	Private	..	Mixed	..	Liberal

### of Public Service Television

c channels, 2004 (or LAY)

Country	%	Hallin/Mancini
Denmark	72	Corporatist
Austria	51	Corporatist
United Kingdom	46	Liberal
Finland	45	Corporatist
Germany	44	Corporatist
Italy	44	Polarised Pluralist
Norway	44	Corporatist
France	41	Polarised Pluralist
Sweden	40	Corporatist
Ireland	38	Liberal
Netherlands	37	Corporatist
Switzerland	36	Corporatist
Belgium	29	Corporatist
<b>Australia</b>	<b>20</b>	Liberal
Canada	11	Liberal
United States	2	Liberal
Mean	38	

No data on Japan or New Zealand

## ers' Funding

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Country	Public funding per capita (US\$)	Revenue per capita (US\$)	Hallin/Mancini
Norway	80	86	Corporatist
Denmark	76	117	Corporatist
Finland	69	73	Corporatist
United Kingdom	57	83	Liberal
Switzerland	56	83	Corporatist
Germany	49	64	Corporatist
Sweden	48	51	Corporatist
Austria	47	96	Corporatist
Japan	44	44	..
Netherlands	39	58	Corporatist
Belgium	31	47	Corporatist
Ireland	28	66	Liberal
France	23	43	Polarised Pluralist
<b>Australia</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>29</b>	Liberal
Italy	22	47	Polarised Pluralist
Canada	16	25	Liberal
New Zealand	6	66	Liberal
Mean	42	63	

No data on USA.

The first data column gives the public funding for the public broadcasters and the second its total revenue (including from advertising and other sources as well as public subsidy.)

## Forms of Television

at each delivery platform 2005 or LAY

Country	Cable	Satellite (DBS)	Terrestrial only	Hallin/Mancini
Japan	73	38	0	..
Netherlands	93	7	0	Corporatist
Switzerland	99	31	0	Corporatist
Belgium	89	7	5	Corporatist
Germany	57	38	6	Corporatist
Ireland	57	38	6	Liberal
Austria	39	52	9	Corporatist
Denmark	58	27	15	Corporatist
United States	59	25	16	Liberal
Canada	64	17	19	Liberal
Sweden	54	27	19	Corporatist
Norway	42	26	32	Corporatist
Finland	46	11	43	Corporatist
United Kingdom	13	31	56	Liberal
New Zealand	2	29	69	Liberal
France	15	12	73	Polarised Pluralist
<b>Australia</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>74</b>	Liberal
Italy	0	15	84	Polarised Pluralist
Mean	49	24	29	

For several countries, including Australia, latest year = 2002

Rows can sum to more than 100 if households are receiving TV from both cable and satellite.

<sup>1</sup> Daniel C Hallin and Paolo Mancini *Comparing Media Systems. Three Models of Media and Politics* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004)

<sup>2</sup> Thorstein Veblen *Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study in the Evolution of Institutions* (Originally published 1899) (Amherst, NY : Prometheus Books, 1998)

<sup>3</sup> Lijphart's three most important books have been *The Politics of Accommodation: pluralism and accommodation in the Netherlands* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1968); *Democracies: Patterns of majoritarian and consensus government in 21 countries* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984); *Patterns of Democracy: Government forms and Performance in 36 Countries* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999).

<sup>4</sup> Gosta Esping-Andersen *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 1990) p.22

<sup>5</sup> Ibid p.23

<sup>6</sup> Rodney Tiffen and Ross Gittins *How Australia Compares* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, 2009) p.xxx

<sup>7</sup> In all three books there are issues about what countries to include. Lijphart is too inclusive, his final book including 36 countries, some of whose democracies were decidedly fragile. In my view, mixing

ocracies does not add to analytical clarity. In one, institutions  
id, where all parties know they need to conform to established  
procedures, and where no group is afraid of a coercive intervention, for example by the military.

<sup>8</sup> Francis G. Castles *Comparative Public Policy. Patterns of Post-war Transformation* (Cheltenham, UK., Edward Elgar, 1998) p.8-9. Castles makes a four way division: English-speaking; Nordic; continental West European; and Southern European. In his reporting, he also lists Switzerland and Japan separately in reporting results.

<sup>9</sup> Hallin and Mancini op cit p.21

<sup>10</sup> Ibid p.13

<sup>11</sup> Confirmed by Hallin (personal communication, 2009)

<sup>12</sup> William Kornhauser *The Politics of Mass Society* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959)

<sup>13</sup> OECD *Historical Statistics 1960-1995* (Paris, OECD 1997)

<sup>14</sup> This idea is developed in Tiffen *News and Power* (Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1989), especially chapter two.

<sup>15</sup> See *ibid* Chapter Six.